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Preface 
The European ICT Poles of Excellence (EIPE) research project at the Institute for Prospective 
Technological Studies is investigating the issues of growth, jobs and innovation, which have become 
main priorities of the European Union’s growth strategy programme ‘Europe 2020’. 
The overall objectives of the EIPE project are to set the general conceptual and methodological 
conditions for defining, identifying, analysing and monitoring the existence and progress of current 
and future EIPE, in order to develop a clear capacity to distinguish these among the many European 
ICT clusters, benchmark them with non-European poles, observe their dynamics and offer a 
thorough analysis of their characteristics.  
The EIPE project started late in 2010 and has, since then, developed a large database of original ICT 
innovation indicators, enriched with geographical information in order to allow localisation and 
aggregation at NUTS 3 and NUTS 2 level. The tool helps us to answer such questions as: How is ICT 
innovation and economic activity distributed and how is it evolving in Europe? What locations are 
attracting new investments in ICT R&D or manufacturing? What is the position of individual 
locations in the global network of ICT activity? 
To date, the following additional publications have emerged from the research: 
 A Framework for assessing Innovation Collaboration Partners and its Application to BRICs. G. De 
Prato and D. Nepelski, JRC-IPTS Working Paper, (2013).  
 The global R&D network. A network analysis of international R&D centres, G. De Prato and D. 
Nepelski, JRC-IPTS Working Paper, (2013).  
 Internal Technology Transfer between China and the Rest of the World. G. De Prato and D. 
Nepelski, JRC-IPTS Working Paper, (2013).  
 International Patenting Strategies in ICT. G. De Prato and D. Nepelski, JRC-IPTS Working Paper, 
(2013).  
 Asia in the Global ICT Innovation Network. Dancing with Tigers, G. De Prato, D. Nepelski 
and J.-P. Simon (Eds), Chandos Asian Studies Series: Contemporary Issues and Trends, Chandos 
Publishing, (2013, forthcoming), 
 Global technological collaboration network. Network analysis of international co-
inventions, G. De Prato and D. Nepelski, Journal of Technology Transfer, 2012, 
 Internationalisation of ICT R&D: a comparative analysis of Asia, EU, Japan, US and the 
RoW, G. De Prato and D. Nepelski, Asian Journal of Technology Innovation, (2012), 
 A network analysis of cities hosting ICT R&D, G. De Prato and D. Nepelski, (2013 - 
forthcoming). 
 
More information can be found under: http://is.jrc.ec.europa.eu/pages/ISG/EIPE.html 
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1. Introduction 
A company that wishes to protect its inventions and products in a particular market needs 
to do so within the jurisdiction of the relevant country. The associated costs and barriers 
are substantial (Hall and Harhoff 2012). Over the years, it has been believed that 
promoting international patent harmonization and greater cooperation and work-sharing 
among national patent authorities is the key to reducing these costs and barriers (van 
Pottelsberghe 2009, Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie 2002). The motivation 
behind the considerable efforts to streamline the international patenting process is to 
foster trade and innovation. Moreover, political pressure to continue the patent system 
harmonization efforts has increased recently (Chu 2008, Chun and Kang 2011). This 
increase has happened despite the fact that patent regimes have been found to have 
ambiguous effect on cross-border economic activity (Co 2004, Nair-Reichert and Duncan 
2008, Qiu and Yu 2010) and patent harmonization seems to be a suboptimal global-growth 
policy (Dinopoulos and Kottaridi 2008, McCalman 2001). 
This paper aims to answer questions about how the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) works. 
The PCT is one of the main efforts to harmonize the global patent system. We address the 
issue of the factors behind non-resident applicants applying for patent protection under 
foreign jurisdictions and whether PCT membership of a country whose protection is sought 
plays a role in this process. 
In our analysis, we used PATSTAT, a comprehensive dataset provided by the European 
Patent Office (EPO), which contains information on the global population of about 65 
million patent applications submitted to around 110 patent offices in the world. For the 
purpose of our analysis, based on priority patent applications, we constructed bilateral 
measures of foreign subsequent patent applications for the global population of countries, 
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which are both sources of patents and destinations for foreign applicants seeking patent 
protection abroad, for the period 1970 - 2009. In order to cast new light on the 
phenomenon of subsequent filings and the role of the PCT in this process, we applied a 
gravity model to analyse what factors determine a country's attractiveness for foreign 
applicants and to what extent the length of a country's PCT membership plays a role. 
The reason for focusing our attention on the role of the PCT as a facilitator of subsequent 
applications is the ambiguity that emerges when we look at the data on foreign patent 
filings and their composition (Furman et al. 2002). The following points are worth noting: 
 First of all, up until recently, first filings to applicants’ national patent offices have 
constituted the majority of patent filings in the world.  
 Second, a surge of subsequent filings, i.e. filings that mostly represent applications to 
foreign patent offices, started only at the beginning of the 90s. Today, the share of 
subsequent filings is 50 percent of total filings. To a large extent, this increase has been 
driven by rapidly growing international commerce. Whenever a company enters a new 
market commercially, it is also likely to be interested in protecting its inventions and 
products within this country.  
 Lastly, since the 70s the number of PCT applications has continuously increased. 
However, despite this rapid growth, the PCT procedure is far from widely used in the 
process of seeking patent protection in several countries. For example, in 2010, of all 
applications submitted to German or UK patent offices by foreign applicants, less than 25% 
were submitted through the PCT procedure (OECD 2009). Moreover, a large share of PCT 
applications terminate at the international phase and the option to seek patent protection 
at the national level is not exercised. In other words, only a small share of PCT applications 
enters the national phase. Instead, it seems that applicants approach patent offices 
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individually and file patents without making use of the PCT procedure and, as a result, a 
lion's share of non-resident filings to national offices is represented by direct subsequent 
filings. 
The question that we tackle in this paper is closely related to the one analyzed by Lerner 
(1997, 1998). Regarding the evidence on the impact of patent reforms on patenting 
activity, he shows that, in general, both domestic and foreign patent applications increased 
in countries undertaking patent protection-enhancing shifts (Paci et al. 1997, Eaton et al. 
1998). However, his analysis explaining the drivers of patenting activity is limited in terms 
of coverage to only sixty countries with the highest GDP. Moreover, it includes aggregate 
measures of incoming foreign patent applications to a country, and neglects the differences 
in bilateral relationships between countries. In contrast, our study covers all the countries 
that are present on the map of patenting activity and uses bilateral measures of cross-
country patenting as a unit of observation. 
Other studies in this area deal with selected effects of the changes in IPR protection 
strength. One example is the effect of IPR changes on international businesses. It was 
shown that U. S. multinational firms benefit from a series of IPR reforms undertaken by 
other countries in the form of increases in royalty payments (WIPO 2012). Another obvious 
way of benefiting from IP protection in overseas markets is through trade. Strong foreign 
patent rights enhance market power and stimulate the expansion of large multinational 
markets across countries (Arora et al. 2001).  
A number of studies concerned with the reforms of the patent system suffer from 
limitations resulting from a focus on single events in patent system design. This restricts 
the possibility of generalizing the findings and extending the implications to countries 
operating in a different context. Examples of such works include, for example, the analysis 
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on the broadening scope of Japanese patents (Sternitzke 2009) and the establishment of 
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in the United States (Hafner 2008). These 
studies find no evidence of an impact of patent reforms on innovative output and, attribute 
the surge in patenting to changes in the management of research. Interestingly, as shown 
for the case study of India, the unclear effects of patent reforms on innovation and 
patenting activity hold for developing countries as well (Eaton and Kortum 1999).  
By taking a global view of the issue of patent system harmonization and covering all the 
countries involved, we expand our understanding of the problem and avoid the risk of 
mixing causes with effects. The results of our study show that being a member of the PCT 
is not positively related to the attractiveness of a country for foreign applicants. Instead, it 
is the size of the market or a country's inventive capacity that attracts foreign applicants to 
seek patent protection in this country. Thus, our analysis casts new light on the 
determinants of the intensity of interactions between countries that are a result of the 
international patenting activity. Moreover, we provide unique evidence on the working of the 
PCT system and its implications for patenting activity. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews the issue of patent 
harmonization with an emphasis on the PCT. Section 3 formulates the gravity model of 
subsequent international patent filings between countries. Section 4 explains the data and 
indicators used in the study. Section 5 presents and discusses the results of empirical 
estimations. Section 6 discusses the results and Section 7 concludes. 
2. The PCT: towards the patent system harmonization 
A patent is the right of an inventor to exclude others from making or using a particular 
invention. This right is sometimes termed an ‘intellectual property right’ and is viewed as an 
incentive for innovation (Arora and Merges 2004, Monk 2009). Seen this way, patents are 
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among diverse factors motivating technological change (Fulton 1997; Lence et al. 2003; 
OECD 2010b; Siegel and Wright 2007). Despite the fact that strong IPRs can also inhibit 
competition (Lence et al. 2003, WIPO 2008, Branstetter et al. 2006, Arora 1995), the 
protection of intellectual property rights has received a fair amount of attention of both 
developed and developing countries. One of the implications of the rise of an interest in the 
protection of IPR is that the international policy advocates strengthening intellectual 
property protection. 
Patenting an invention is a costly process and, as patent protection is territorial in nature, 
any additional patent application filed to a foreign patent office significantly increases this 
cost. The empirical evidence clearly confirms that the price elasticity of the demand for 
patent applications is strictly negative (Pagano 2007, Moy 1993). This point is very well 
illustrated by the case of Europe and the discussion about a single European patent (Hall 
and Harhoff 2012). A natural way of addressing the problem of high costs and barriers to 
IP protection in a number of countries are the attempts to harmonize patent system across 
national jurisdictions (van Pottelsberghe 2009, Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie 
2002). 
The turning point in the development of patent law harmonization was the Vienna 
exhibition of 1873 (Moon 2011, Oh et al. 2010). Before the exhibition, American 
participants were concerned about the Austrian patent law and the risk of plagiarism and 
piracy. As a result, parallel to the exhibition, a congress was held to discuss the issue of 
patents and the harmonization of the patent system across countries. Following these 
discussions, a series of conferences took place and finally the Paris Convention for the 
Protection of Industrial Property (commonly referred to as Paris Convention) was signed in 
1883. 
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The Paris Convention did not address all issues that were raised prior to it and it constituted 
rather a flexible framework for the protection of industrial property (van Pottelsberghe 
2009). Under the Paris convention procedure, in order to obtain a patent in more than one 
country, subsequent patent applications had to be filed in foreign countries within 12 
months from the submission of the priority application. However, formal requirements 
between countries still persisted and, consequently, applicants were forced to prepare 
different versions of the application for each patent office. Moreover, as the applicants 
were required to translate their applications into other languages and were obliged to hire a 
local agent to file their applications, the direct filing of patent applications in multiple 
countries was still an expensive undertaking. 
In 1966, the Executive Committee of the International Union for the Protection of Industrial 
Property asked the United International Bureaux for the Protection of Intellectual Property 
(BIRPI), the predecessor of the World Intellectual Property Office (WIPO), to propose 
solutions to reduce the duplication of the effort both for applicants and national patent 
offices (OECD 2010a). One year later, a draft of an international treaty was presented, 
which after a few round of negotiations was adopted in Washington in 1970 as the Patent 
Cooperation Treaty. The treaty came into force in 1978 and today has 145 signatory 
countries (Lerner 2002a, Lerner 2002). 
The PCT is one of the major undertakings in the process of patent harmonization. It is an 
international treaty for rationalization and cooperation with regard to the filing, searching 
and examination of patent applications and the dissemination of the technical information 
contained therein. The PCT does not give the right to “international patents” and the task of 
and responsibility for granting patents remains exclusively in the hands of the national 
patent offices in which protection is sought for, i.e. designated countries. In other words, the 
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PCT procedure allows applicants seeking for patent protection in a large number of 
countries to file an "international" patent application to a patent office of a contracting 
state for the search of previous inventions (OECD 2008a). In order to obtain patent 
protection in a particular state, the applicant still needs to file a patent application in a 
patent office of interest. Thus, although application and search are to some extent 
standardized across offices, grants are not. This way the PCT, along the Paris convention or 
the TRIPS Agreement, forms a basic framework for patent protection across countries. 
The principal objective of the PCT is to simplify and streamline the previously established 
means of applying for protection for inventions in several countries (Oh et al. 2010). This is 
expected to benefit the patent offices and the users of the patent system. Considering that 
individual patent offices are confronted with the increasing number of applications, they 
face a problem of maintaining a high quality of the system. Under the PCT system, by the 
time the international application reaches the designated office, it has already went 
through the examination process that took place in the receiving office, searched by the 
International Searching Authority and possibly examined by an International Preliminary 
Examining Authority. This way, national patent offices benefit from lower work loads, as 
they do not need to duplicate those efforts. Regarding the benefits to the users of the 
patent system, the main benefit of a PCT application is that fewer searches need to be 
conducted, which reduces the cost of international filings. It goes without saying that poor 
results of a patent search or poor examination can have negative consequences for the 
applicant.  
Moreover, the PCT is meant to facilitate and accelerate the access by interested parties to 
technical information related to inventions and to speed the technology diffusion process in 
developing countries (Schneiderman 2007). To achieve this, the PCT was to provide an 
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infrastructure and access to an effective source of up-to-date technical information from 
which third parties may derive knowledge and by encouraging direct technology transfer 
from companies willing either to invest in infrastructure in a country or to sell or license 
technology to companies in that country based on patents. 
Considering the above discussion on the PCT, we could expect that the introduction of this 
procedure would have a positive impact on the level of international patenting activities 
(Schneiderman 2007). In other words, applicants who are interested in protecting their 
inventions in several countries would file an application under the PCT procedure, rather 
than to file separate patent applications at the same time in all of the countries in which 
they would like to protect their inventions. 
3. Gravity model of international patent applications 
In this paper we are interested in addressing empirically the question of what factors are 
behind companies' motivations in seeking for patent protection under foreign jurisdictions 
and whether PCT membership of a country whose protection is sought for plays a role in 
these motivations. In order to carry out our analysis, it would be useful to adhere to a 
model that specifies what determines international patent filings. Unfortunately, to our best 
knowledge, there are not fully adequate theoretical models dealing with this issue. 
The closest theoretical concept suitable for an empirical analysis of international patenting 
is the gravity model of trade, which, except for being widely used in the studies of 
international trade (De Benedictis and Tajoli 2011) and has already found its way to study 
other types of bilateral relationships between countries. One example includes the 
phenomenon of international collaboration between inventors (Picci 2010, Thomson 2011, 
Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie 2001, De Prato and Nepelski 2012). Thus, we 
believe that the gravity model allows us to formulate predictions concerning the 
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determinants of international patenting, i.e. why applicants seek patent protection overseas. 
The straightforward form of the gravity equation can be expressed by 
ij
ji
ij
D
GDPGDP
L

  (1) 
where two counties i and j with non-negative GDP and the distance ijD , where distance 
might be measured in terms of geographical and cultural proximity, are expected to 
develop a positive exchange link (i.e. 1ijL ).  
Taking this theoretical prediction as a starting point, we proceed with formulating a gravity 
model in which we expect that a country's attractiveness for foreign applicants depends on 
some of its characteristics. To identify these characteristics, we derive a set of factors that 
are used in studies conceptualising the issue of international trade, the internationalisation 
of innovation and international technology transfer (De Benedictis and Tajoli 2011, Head et 
al. 2010, Macdonald 2004, OECD 2008b, Dunning 1994, Kuemmerle 1999). Except for 
geographic and cultural distance, we include a number of other explanatory variables that 
are meant to capture the proximity between countries that are involved into a relationship 
of patent seeking and patent granting. These variables can be grouped into two main 
blocks: economic capacity and inventive capacity of a country. In addition, we include 
measures related to the PCT membership. 
Taking the above considerations into account, a function that is expected to capture the 
relationship between the propensity to file patent applications by applicants overseas can 
be expressed as follows: 
),,,,,,,,,( ijtjtjtitjtjtitijijijt PCTInvInvFDIGDPGDPDistCommLangfIntApp   (2) 
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where ijtIntApp represents the count of subsequent patent applications filed by applicants 
residing in country i to the national patent office of country j in )2009,1970(t . To explain 
the emergence and intensity of relationships between countries we use a number of 
variables capturing factors discussed above, i.e. economic and innovation capacity, together 
with additional characteristics related to geographical and cultural proximity, and, finally, a 
variable controlling for the length of a country membership in the PCT. Unobserved time 
and country effects are captured by ijt . 
Concerning the geographical proximity, we use a variable controlling for the distance 
between countries i and j, ijDist . In addition, in order to account for other frictions in the 
process of international patenting resulting from cultural differences, we include a dummy 
variable ijCommLang , which indicates whether two countries share a common official 
language. 
Regarding economic size of countries linked through patents submitted by non-resident 
applicants to foreign patent offices, information on GDP (in current US$) both country i and 
j in period t is included. Altogether, as discussed above, measures of a country's GDP are 
expected to capture the economic prowess of a country of an applicant, on the one hand, 
and the attractiveness of the market in which patent protection is sought for, on the other 
hand. In addition, in order to control for the openness of a country to internationalisation of 
economic activity, we also include measures of foreign direct investment jtFDI , referring 
to a country in which a foreign applicants seeks to protect her invention (in current US$). 
Following our expectations that not only distance hiders and economic factors motivates 
applicants to commercialize their technology and know-how in overseas markets, we 
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control for the innovation capacities of both countries by the total number of patents of 
country i and j at time t. 
Finally, to address our question concerning the working of the PCT, we measure the 
duration of a country's membership in the PCT by jtPCT . This variable refers to the country 
in which non-resident applicant seek to protect her inventions. Intuitively, countries with 
longest record of PCT membership would have the highest share of subsequent patent 
applications among the total number of foreign applications submitted to their national 
patent offices. 
4. Data 
As already pointed out, the variables used for the investigation carried on in the present 
work can be grouped into those referring to the economic capacity of countries on one side, 
and those intended to measure the inventive capacity of countries themselves, on the 
other. Moreover, the information regarding the enforcement of the PCT is considered. 
Measures of international patent filings 
In making use of indicators based on patent data to provide evidences on innovative 
activity, some considerations have to be taken in mind. For the extent patent statistics are 
used in the present paper, for example, it must be briefly recalled that patent is not the 
only method to protect the exploitation of inventions, and not all inventions are patented. 
Moreover, the approach to patent invention is also differing from country to country, and 
different patenting strategies could result in difference in the number of files per single 
invention too. Therefore, direct comparison could result difficult. Notwithstanding these and 
further aspects which literature already addressed extensively (WIPO 2008, OECD 2010b, 
De Rassenfosse et al. 2011), the availability of patent data allow for a valuable insight on 
innovation and on the behaviour of innovative companies. 
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With regard to the block of variables regarding countries inventive capacity, the dataset 
built for the present paper is based on patent data coming from the European Patent Office 
(EPO) Worldwide Patent Statistical Database (known as the PATSTAT database), which 
provides a snapshot of the data available in the EPO’s ‘master bibliographic database 
DocDB’ at a specific point in time. This database provides a worldwide coverage of patent 
applications submitted to around 90 Patent Offices in the world. The present analysis is 
based on indicators built by extracting and elaborating patent application data from the 
October 2011 release of the PATSTAT database, taking into account patent applications 
filed at 59 Patent Offices: the EPO itself and 58 National Patent Offices including those of 
the 27 EU Member States, the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), the Japan Patent 
Office (JPO) as well as the other most active Patent Offices worldwide, including China and 
India. To the selected patent offices in 2009 were filed about 99% of the total number of 
priority patent applications. The time period taken into account covers from January 1st, 
1970 to December 31st, 2009. Data coming from PATSTAT are elaborated through a series 
of methodological steps, starting with those consolidated in literature (De Rassenfosse et 
al. 2011, Turlea et al. 2011, Picci 2010) to deal with some remaining criticalities, mainly 
related to the process of exchange of information among patent offices, which affects 
patent data. First, as the needed variables are intended to provide measure of the inventive 
capability of countries, rather than of the productivity of patent offices, the subset of 
'priority patent applications' is initially taken into account, to avoid double counting and the 
limitation coming from considering granted patents. The year is assigned along with the 
information coming with the filing date given when the application is first filed at a patent 
office by an applicant seeking patent. 
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To the extent of the present analysis the issue of missing information is in fact still 
relevant, when it comes to identify the country of residence of applicants (or inventors), and 
several methodological steps are followed in order to collect missing country information 
from other records related to the patent application, and to proxy it with that of the country 
where the application has been filed only as a last resort. The ‘applicant’ criterion is applied, 
so that applications are attributed to countries along with the country of residence of the 
first applicant. 
The priority applications considered were of standard applications and applications 
submitted under the PCT regime. In order to complete the dataset necessary to investigate 
companies strategies, each of the priority applications has been linked to all the 
subsequent filings to any extent referring to the application which represented the first 
request of protection of the invention. Subsequent applications were belonging to two sets: 
that of subsequent standard applications and that of PCT international applications 
entering the national phase; both have been considered in building the complete set of 
data. At this point, pair of countries were formed by linking the country of applicant of the 
priority applications, on one side, and the country of the patent office to which the 
subsequent application have been submitted, on the other side. To each pair of countries 
the number of applications, of each type, has been assigned, grouped along with the year 
of subsequent filing. 
Patent data are exploited also to control for the innovation capacities of countries, by 
taking into account the total number of priority patent applications calculated this time 
along with the inventor criterion, for each of the considered countries and for each year in 
the period between 1970 and 2009. The relevant descriptive statistics are reported in Table 
1. 
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Other data sources   
 
In order to build the variable relative to the number of years of participation into the PCT 
framework, the date of enforcement of the PCT in each of the countries involved in the 
analysis has been considered. The WIPO indicates the full date of accession and of 
entrance into force for each of the contracting parties, which were 20 in 1978, then grown 
to 30 in 1980 and 45 in 1990 to reach 108 in 2000 and to be nowadays 144 (Argentina 
and Iran signed in 1970, but the participation does not result enforced yet). The number of 
years of enforcement has been calculated on the basis of the dates made available by 
WIPO on its website.1 
Besides the variable controlling for the length of a country membership in the PCT, a set of 
other indicators has been built to describe the economic capacity of each country. The size 
of the economy has been represented by the GDP in current US$ provided by World Bank 
data for whole covered the period. To the same extent, data on net inflows of foreign direct 
investment in current US$ came from the same sources, i.e. the World Bank.2 
Additional characteristics related to geographical and cultural proximity, instead, are built 
upon data coming from the CEPII bilateral trade data (Head et al. 2010), and allow to take 
into account whether a pair of countries is sharing or not a common language, and to how 
much their geographical distance accounts for. 
                                              
1  Source: WIPO; available at: http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/statistics/details.jsp?treaty_id=6) (last accessed 
Jan.26th, 2012). 
2  Available online at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD   (last accessed on 31 January 
2012) 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Nr of subsequent applications 51437 172,03 1018,87 1 38640 
Nr of subsequent direct applications 51437 168,38 997,83 0 36595 
Nr of subsequent PCT applications 51437 3,65 30,59 0 2045 
Nr of patents (inventor criterion) 7840 1978,17 18217,17 0 322581,40 
FDI in-flow (current US$) 5771 3.11e+09 1.55e+10 -3.89e+10 3.28e+11 
GDP (current US $) 6749 1.33e+11 6,78e+11 1.43e+07 1.44e+13 
PCT membership duration 2291 10,77 8,135356 0 31 
Common Language 42336 0,17 0,372471 0 1 
Distance in km 42336 8256,27 4632,74 1.88 19951,16 
 
5. Empirical results 
To estimate the function specified in (2), we run OLS regression with time and country fixed 
effects. Table 2 reports the estimation results for the following three models: the first 
model includes all subsequent patent applications by residents from country i that were 
submitted to the patent office of country j at time t. In order to get some more insights into 
the motivations of applications to seek for patent protection in foreign countries when 
using different patent filing procedures, the second and third specification concern PCT and 
direct applications respectively. For each model, we first report estimations with variables 
controlling for geographic and cultural proximity, economic size, and net FDI in-flows. The 
extended specification includes the control for the PCT membership duration of country j. 
Regarding all the coefficients of the basic gravity model for all patent applications by non-
residents submitted between 1970 and 2009, i.e. distance, common language, economy 
size and invention capacity, have the expected signs, and are significant. The coefficients of 
the FDI in-flows to country j are negative. Regarding the second estimation, we can see that 
the coefficient related to the number of years of a country's PCT membership is negative. 
In other words, the PCT membership has a reverse effect on a country's attractiveness for 
seeking patent protection by foreign applicants. 
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Concerning the sub-sample with PCT applications, the regression is restricted to the period 
between 1978 and 2009, i.e. it starts from the year in which the PCT came into force. To a 
large extent, the outcomes of these estimations overlap with the previous results. However, 
we can see that the coefficient of the variable controlling for the economic size of country i 
changed the sign. In other words, it points to the fact that PCT application procedure is 
likely to be used by economically smaller countries. However, due to the lower level of the 
coefficient controlling for the size of country j, the group of addressees of the very same 
applications includes smaller countries as well, as compared to the sub-sample with direct 
applications. Regarding the effect of a country's PCT membership duration, even in this 
case it is not relevant. Thus, even for applications submitted under the PCT procedure, the 
length and experience of a country with the PCT system does not affect non-resident 
applicants to file a patent application in the country. 
Turning our attention to the estimation results on the direct applications by non-residents, 
we can see that the results are very close to those obtained with the full sample. The 
reason for this is that this type of applications forms the majority of patent applications 
submitted by non-resident applicants. Nevertheless, a comparison between the PCT and 
direct applications provide some interesting insights. First of all, we can observe that the 
coefficient values of the variables controlling for countries proximity, i.e. geographical 
distance and common language, are of lesser importance for PCT applications than for 
direct applications. In other words, the PCT procedure has a mediating effect on the 
distance between countries and it facilitates filing applications to distant countries.  
Furthermore, comparing the factors behind the propensity to use different patent 
application procedures, we can further say that there is a significant difference between 
using PCT and direct patent applications. First of all, we observe a strong difference with 
  
 20 
respect to the economic size of both an applicant's country and the country where patent 
protection is requested. In the case of PCT applications, there is a strong negative impact of 
iGDP , as compared to a positive effect of the same variable in the specification for direct 
filings. In practical terms, this means that the PCT procedure is more likely to be used by 
applicants residing in relatively small countries. Moreover, as the value of jGDP  is also 
relatively smaller in the case of PCT applications, we can expect that applications submitted 
under this procedure are directed to smaller countries, compared to direct patent 
applications. Similar observations can be made with respect to the innovation capacity of 
both countries, i.e. i and j. 
All in all, the results show that the level of GDP and invention capacity of both countries, i.e. 
the source of technology and country whose patent protection is sought for, are the major 
reasons to seek for patent protection in overseas markets is the access to the market. 
Hence, as in the case of international trade, the potential size of the economy, as a 
measure of its attractiveness, together with the level of technological development can be 
considered as a major predictor of applicants' propensity to seek for patent protection for 
products and technology they market in a country. In light of this, we find that the role of 
the PCT membership is not significant for applicants seeking for IP protection in foreign 
countries.  
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Table 2: The drivers of patent applications by non-residents.  
 
(1)  
Log of all subsequent applications submitted 
by residents of country i to country j between 
1970 and 2009  
(IntAppijt) 
(2)  
Log of PCT subsequent applications submitted 
by residents of country i to country j between 
1978 and 2009 
(IntAppijt) 
(3)  
Log of direct subsequent applications 
submitted by residents of country i to country j 
between 1970 and 2009 
(IntAppijt) 
Common Language (CommLangij) 0,360*** 0,362*** 0,237*** 0,236*** 0,361*** 0,364*** 
 (18,26) (18,45) (7,35) (7,33) (18,23) (18,42) 
Log Distanceij (Distij) -0,334*** -0,332*** -0,177*** -0,177*** -0,332*** -0,331*** 
 (-41,56) (-41,55) (-13,99) (-14,02) (-41,1) (-41,1) 
Log real GDPit (GDPit) 0,523*** 0,530*** -0,268*** -0,267*** 0,521*** 0,526*** 
 (18,27) (18,55) (-4,63) (-4,61) (18) (18,26) 
Log real GDPjt (GDPjt) 0,240*** 0,253*** 0,131** 0,139*** 0,248*** 0,261*** 
 (8,01) (8,47) (2,53) (2,66) (8,23) (8,67) 
Log FDIjt (FDIjt) -0,044*** -0,037*** -0,058*** -0,058*** -0,043*** -0,035*** 
 (-6,81) (-5,67) (-5,12) (-5,09) (-6,56) (-5,42) 
Log Patentit (Invit) 0,242*** 0,242*** 0,220*** 0,219*** 0,243*** 0,243*** 
 (31,29) (31,47) (8,91) (8,91) (31,15) (31,36) 
Log Patentjt (Invjt) 0,069*** 0,045*** 0,057*** 0,052** 0,071*** 0,047*** 
 (8,71) (5,64) (2,78) (2,48) (8,94) (5,89) 
PCT membership duration (PCTjt)  -0,032***  -0,008  -0,033*** 
  (-17,58)  (-1,38)  (-17,76) 
Country and time effects included YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant -15,519 -16,375 1,506 2,501 -15,624 -16,460 
Number of observations 42.639 42.639 11.059 11.059 41.892 41.892 
R-squared 0,7132 0,7153 0,5920 0,5921 0,7157 0,7178 
The econometric method is Ordinary Least Squares, including country and time fixed effects; t-values are in brackets.  
***,** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% probability threshold respectively 
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6. Discussion 
The results presented above show that the PCT patent filing procedure does not play a 
major role in the decisions of non-resident applicants to seek for patent protection in 
foreign countries. Instead, such characteristics as geographic, economic and inventive 
distance between countries facilitate international patenting. Below we would like to shortly 
discuss these findings and their interpretation. 
Regarding the market size, it is worth noting that the issue of market attractiveness in the 
context of technology transfer is not only related to the trade in technologically advanced 
products. Instead, the demand for IP and patent protection is strongly related to the global 
rise of the knowledge economy, whose boundaries are not limited to developed countries. 
One implication of this development is the fact that, over the last years, technology and 
knowledge have become increasingly definable and tradable goods. The possibility to sell 
technology rather than final goods across the borders increased (WIPO 2012, OECD 
2008b). A confirmation of this development is clearly visible in the increasing trend in the 
commercialization of IP and the resulting emergence of a market for IP, and more 
specifically a market in patents (Kanwar and Evenson 2003, OECD 2008b). In addition, 
organizations other than businesses have become aware of the value of their IP and new 
institutions have emerged to facilitate the creation and commercialization of IP across the 
countries (Greenhalgh and Rogers 2007). These trends have lead to an increase in the size 
of the global market for technology and technologically advanced products and, as a result, 
spurred the growth in the demand for IPR protection at home and overseas. 
Regarding the innovation capacity, we find evidence that both the invention capacity of an 
applicant's country and of the country in which patent protection is sought for is an 
important facilitator of international patenting. There are at least two reasons that can 
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explain this dependency. The first one relates to the fact that the innovation capacity of an 
applicant's country. The second one relates to the country in which an applicant seeks for 
patent protection. 
Considering the inventive capacity of an applicant's country, it simply reflects the 
availability of inventions for which there may be demand inside and outside of its country. 
The implication of this is straightforward: the higher the production of invention in a 
country, the more knowledge and technology it has to offer to the rest of the world. 
Obviously, owners interested in transferring or exploiting their intellectual property abroad 
are also interested in having their assets protected in countries in which they do business.  
The relationship between international patenting and the inventive capacity of a country 
whose IP protection is sought for is more complex. Intuitively, the level of innovation 
capacity of the destination country reflects its availability of technology and know-how, 
which might be either complementary or competitive to the invention for which protection 
is being sought for. Regarding the technological complementarity, technology transfer is 
justified if a country has the capability to either accumulate or complement the technology. 
This is related to the fact that technology transfer involves usually more than just the 
transfer of the knowledge covered by patents (Motohashi 2003). Alternatively, as noted by 
Furman (2002), the level of GDP also reflects a country's ability to transform its knowledge 
stock into economic development. Thus, the invention and/or absorptive capacity of a 
country and/or transferred know-how are complementary to the codified knowledge 
covered by patents. Regarding the issue of technological competition, the availability of 
know-how in a country to which technology is transferred is also a sign of the country's 
ability to copy the technology. In either case, i.e. technological complementarity or 
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competition, drawing boundaries of the transferred IP is critical for retaining the rents, once 
the technology evolves and is commercially exploited.  
The level of invention capacity, expressed in terms of the number of patents, might also 
reflect the strength and efficiency of IP protection in a country in which an applicant wants 
to protect her invention (Eaton et al. 1998, Paci et al. 1997, Fulton 1997, Sternitzke 2009). 
In other words, efficient protection of intellectual property produced within a country gives 
a foreign applicant who is transferring its technology to that country a guarantee that her 
protection will also obtain a required level of protection. 
After disentangling the effects of economic and inventive capacity of countries on different 
types of applications, we find that the PCT procedure is more likely to be used by applicants 
residing in relatively smaller countries and that PCT applications are submitted to smaller 
countries, as compared to direct patent applications. This can be interpreted in the following 
way: On the one hand, the PCT procedure makes it easier and cheaper for applicants from 
smaller countries to protect their inventions. On the other hand, however, the protection for 
these inventions is being sought for in markets with lower economic potential. This clearly 
raises the question of the value of inventions for which applicants choose different 
institutional tracks of protection. 
7. Conclusions 
The last few years of increasing international trade and globalization of economic activity, 
together with the rise of the knowledge economy, has raised an interest in IP protection 
both within national borders and across countries. However, intuitively speaking, the strong 
incentives for multinational companies doing what is necessary to have their inventions and 
technologies protected in many countries are weakened by the complexity, cost and 
redundancy of applying for patent protection in multiple national patent offices. As the 
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emergence of a global patent system is a long way off, we are witnessing a strong increase 
in the efforts to harmonize national patent systems in order to facilitate international 
patenting activity for businesses and to reduce the duplication of efforts of patent offices. 
The PCT, the Madrid System, the European Patent Convention (EPC), the implementation of 
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and the 
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) (currently being negotiated) are some of the 
most important means of harmonizing of IPR protection across the world. They are also 
commonly referred to as the main drivers of the increase in patenting activity and 
facilitators of cross-border patent applications. In light of these developments, the 
relatively late take-off and still low level of PCT applications comes as a surprise. 
In the preceding analysis, we aimed to fill the gap in understanding how harmonization 
works in practice and how it affects patenting activity. The results of our work do not 
confirm that the PCT has improved the process of international IP protection. Nevertheless, 
the results we obtained in our analysis allow us to formulate some conclusions and 
implications with respect to a number of areas ranging from the business patterns of 
international patenting, country innovation policy and the process of IPR protection 
harmonization. 
First of all, from the business perspective of applicants who wish to protect their inventions 
in the global market, it can be said that the business world seems to have found a way of 
coping with the complexity and burden of multi-country patenting. Despite the availability 
of patenting procedures that facilitate patenting in multiple countries, such as the PCT, 
businesses make little use of them. Instead, driven probably by the need to have access to 
quick protection in a number of countries, they choose a patenting strategy that involves 
parallel and direct patent filings to a selected number of national offices. Judging by the 
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results of our analysis, we can conclude that the selection of these countries is based on 
their economic and inventive power. In other words, it is either the potential benefit of 
having secured revenues from a relevant market or the existence of potential competitors 
who are able to copy an invention, or both these factors, that motivate owners of IP to file 
patent applications in foreign countries. Consequently, a successful international patenting 
strategy should involve an assessment and selection of countries and patent offices whose 
protection is vital to a firm's success. This assessment should be based on the availability 
of technological complementary and/or competitive assets in a country. A result of this 
assessment would be a portfolio of countries ranked according to their importance with 
respect to the protection of a firm's intellectual capital. 
Second, regarding national interests, it emerges from the results of this study and the 
above discussion that the meaning and interpretation of the findings concerning the 
working of the PCT and the patterns of international patenting are not the same for each 
country involved in the process of patent harmonization. Depending on the perspective of a 
particular country, the implications may be perceived as positive by some countries and 
negative by others. The main reason for this is that, depending on the position of a country, 
the outcomes of the harmonization process are likely to affect the distribution of 
bargaining power (Moy 1993). Hence, it will determine not only its attractiveness as a 
market for technological products, but it will also influence its position as a producer of 
technology and a technological collaboration partner. This point is very well illustrated by 
the fact that, to a large extent, the persistence of differences in IP protection is of a 
political nature. Depending on the perspective, some countries favour patent harmonization 
and some are against it. It is often argued that the process of patent harmonization is 
supported by developed countries, as it benefits their economic expansion. However, the 
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differences among countries with respect to the policy of patent harmonization cannot be 
organized along the division between developed vs. developing countries. For example, 
although India and Brazil may show strong similarities in both the economic and political 
realm, they show contrasting interests in the area of IPRs and, as a result, their policies 
differ (Charnovitz 1998). Whereas India pursues a policy of strategic cooperation with the 
United States, Brazil remains reluctant in this respect. A partial explanation of this 
reluctance is related to concerns over an unequal accumulation of intellectual capital and, 
hence, benefits (Moy 1993). This implies that national innovation policies should include in 
their agenda an assessment of the implications of IPR harmonization developments and a 
plan to address them. 
Third, the PCT was intended to encourage technology transfer, particularly to developing 
countries. However, the weak effect of a country’s PCT membership on attracting foreign 
applicants to file patent applications in that country's patent office and, hence, to reveal 
information on the invention, raises some doubts as to its effectiveness for technology 
transfer between countries. As already pointed out (Schneiderman 2007), the infrastructure 
and instruments created for this purpose are still not sufficient and the recently proposed 
recommendations for improvement confirm that, so far, the PCT has not lived up to its 
promise of making technology available to developing countries. The parties involved in the 
design of the harmonization of IP protection should therefore be required address this point 
in their work.  
Fourth, an implication of this analysis for further work on patent harmonization is that 
better assessment of the costs and benefits to other parties involved is required.  Moreover, 
countries also need to take into account the broader environment, as in the case of FDI or 
international trade in general. Consequently, while designing IPR protection mechanisms 
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and policies, policy makers should give them a multinational dimension, acknowledging that 
whatever happens in one country, affects the other countries and vice versa. Rather than 
designing policies driven by the notion of securing profits from invention, it may be 
advisable to create a mutually beneficial system of collaboration, taking into account 
interactions with a large number of players. The new paradigm of inter-country 
relationships and mutual dependencies in the innovation process involves the creation of a 
holistic IP regime that creates the right balance between countries that source and 
countries that produce inventions. The success of this process will determine the process of 
innovation and new technology creation and, hence, the total payoff available to all the 
contributors. 
Summing up, the structure and functioning of a global system of IP protection challenges 
the traditional way of thinking about a number of aspects of research and innovation policy 
in general, and IPR protection in particular. Approaches that were usually shaped by a one-
sided perspective and defined by the notion of competition need to be adjusted to the 
changing ways of organising economic and innovative activity. A new approach needs to 
take into account the need to develop collaboration mechanisms that support mutual co-
dependencies between countries. This confirms that the issue of IPR protection in the 
international context is still important and the implications of patent harmonization are far 
from being fully understood yet. Hence, comprehensive assessment of the efforts to 
harmonize IP protection is needed. 
In conclusion, although this paper provides a number of valuable insights into the practical 
functioning of the PCT and the determinants of international patenting, it has a few 
limitations. First of all, due to the fact that there is no theoretical foundation which explains 
applicants’ incentives for seeking for patent protection in foreign countries, we make use of 
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the gravity model and explain, at aggregate level, the intensity of bilateral links between 
countries. Moreover, we focus our attention only on one aspect, i.e. the attractiveness of a 
country for foreign applicants, and do not analyse other effects of patent harmonization 
reforms. Nevertheless, the results presented above show that the answers to the questions 
at the heart of this study are far from straightforward and they deliver additional 
information explaining the existence and intensity of international patenting. Moreover, they 
cast some new light on the working of IPR harmonization efforts and mechanisms and 
provide some guidance for further development in this area. This leads us to believe that 
future analysis of the effects of IPR harmonization on a range of socio-economic aspects 
would be valuable. 
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